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By linking iterative learning and knowledge generation with power-sharing, adaptive co-management
(ACM) provides a potential solution to resolving complex social-ecological problems. In this paper we
evaluate ACM as a mechanism for resolving conservation conflict using a case study in Scotland, where
seal and salmon fishery stakeholders have opposing and entrenched objectives. ACM emerged in 2002,
successfully resolving this long-standing conflict. Applying evaluation approaches from the literature, in
2011 we interviewed stakeholders to characterise the evolution of ACM, and factors associated with its
success over 10 years. In common with other ACM cases, triggers for the process were shifts in slow
variables controlling the system (seal and salmon abundance, public perceptions of seal shooting), and
exogenous shocks (changes in legal mandates, a seal disease outbreak). Also typical of ACM, three phases
of evolution were evident: emerging local leadership preparing the system for change, a policy window
of opportunity, and stakeholder partnerships building the resilience of the system. Parameters main-
taining ACM were legal mechanisms and structures, legal power held by government, and the willing-
ness of all stakeholders to reach a compromise and experiment with an alternative governance approach.
Results highlighted the critical role of government power and support in resolving conservation conflict,
which may constrain the extent of local stakeholder-driven ACM. The evaluation also demonstrated how,
following perceived success, the trajectory of ACM has shifted to a ‘stakeholder apathy’ phase, with
declining leadership, knowledge exchange, stakeholder engagement, and system resilience. We discuss
remedial actions required to revive the process, and the importance of long term government resourcing
and alternative financing schemes for successful conflict resolution. Based on the results we present a
generic indicator framework and participatory method for the longitudinal evaluation of ACM applied to
conservation conflict resolution.
Crown Copyright © 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)..A. Butler), jyo@ceh.ac.uk
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vier Ltd. This is an open access arti1. Introduction
Adaptive co-management (ACM) is a novel form of environ-
mental governance that can enhance social-ecological systems'
resilience and adaptability to uncertainty and change (Armitage
et al., 2009; Plummer et al., 2012). In contrast to conventional,
centralised ‘command-and-control' approaches, it combines the
iterative learning, knowledge generation and problem-solving ofcle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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conflict resolution of co-management (Olsson et al., 2004a; Folke
et al., 2005; Armitage et al., 2007; Fabricius and Currie, 2015).
Folke et al. (2002, p. 8) broadly define ACM as “a process by
which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are
tested and revised in a dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process
of trial-and-error”, which is known to evolve through stages
(Olsson et al., 2004b; Berkes et al., 2007; Plummer and Baird,
2013).
One context where the utility of ACM has not been assessed is
conservation conflict (Butler, 2011), which occurs when conserva-
tion interests wish to protect wildlife species that impact the
livelihoods of others (Redpath et al., 2013). Examples include pre-
dation of livestock (e.g. Butler, 2000, Butler et al., 2014) or game
(e.g. Graham et al., 2005;White et al., 2009) by protected predators,
and retaliatory killing by the affected stakeholders. These conflicts
are often intractable because actors' worldviews and values are
polarised and have become entrenched (Young et al., 2010). Elim-
inating conflict permanently is unlikely, but reducing the negative
impacts on species and stakeholders by finding compromises is
sometimes feasible (Colyvan and Regan, 2011). Designing mecha-
nisms that can achieve sustained conflict resolution is an evolving
field of research (Dickman, 2010; Redpath et al., 2013). Early evi-
dence suggests that keys to success are ongoing collaborative
decision-making processes which involve all stakeholders equi-
tably (Young et al., 2013a), trial innovative ideas, and include
evaluation to provide learning (Walkerden, 2005; Redpath et al.,
2013).
To understand the value of ACM for conservation conflict
resolution requires systematic evaluation of case studies.
Plummer and Armitage (2007) proposed a generic framework to
evaluate ACM interventions based on outcome parameters.
Armitage et al. (2009) also suggested 10 pre-conditions that must
exist for successful ACM to be maintained. These approaches
illustrate the necessity for measuring progress towards intended
outcomes, plus assessing whether the outcomes have created
pre-conditions for the collaborative process to continue (Innes
and Booher, 1999; Berkes et al., 2007). While some methods
have been designed to monitor components of ACM (e.g. Cundill
and Fabricius, 2010; Smedstad and Gosnell, 2013; Fabricius and
Currie, 2015), none have explicitly integrated the parameters
developed by Plummer and Armitage (2007) and Armitage et al.
(2009), nor calibrated them against successful ACM interventions
(Plummer et al., 2012).
In this paper we investigate the characteristics of successful
ACM in the context of a conservation conflict. We use a case study
in Scotland, the Moray Firth Seal Management Plan (MFSMP),
which was launched in 2005 as a pilot initiative to balance con-
flicting stakeholder interests in seal conservation and salmon
fisheries (Butler et al., 2008). Following its perceived success, the
model is being scaled-out through national legislation (The Scottish
Government, 2014).
We had three research goals. First, we aimed to understand the
evolution of ACM in the context of conservation conflict, and the
factors that triggered the process. Second, we sought to identify
the factors associated with the MFSMP's success in terms of
Plummer and Armitage (2007) and Armitage et al.'s (2009) ACM
parameter frameworks by calibrating them against the attainment
of the MFSMP's objectives. Third, we aimed to develop and test a
participatory method to integrate and implement the frameworks
for the longitudinal evaluation of ACM. Informed by the results we
present a generic indicator framework for evaluating pre-
conditions and outcomes of ACM applied to conservation conflict
resolution.2. Study area
2.1. The Moray Firth and seal-salmon fishery conflict
The Moray Firth is a 5230 km2 marine embayment in northeast
Scotland (Fig. 1). Eighteen major rivers flow into the Firth which
have historically supported an annual run of up to 270,000 adult
Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) (Fig. 2). At the time of the MFSMP's
development there were 20 coastal salmon netting stations plus
more than 100 in-river rod fisheries, managed by 12 statutory
District Salmon Fishery Boards (DSFBs). Angling tourism is of high
economic importance to the Moray Firth (Butler et al., 2009). The
region is also a nationally important site for marine mammals. In
the 1990s up to 1500 harbour seals (Phoca vitulina) were resident
in the Firth, plus 900 grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) which are
part of a larger North Sea population (Butler et al., 2008). Together
with bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), these species sup-
ported a small but expanding marine wildlife tourism industry
(Hoyt, 2001).
Throughout Scotland marine survival rates of salmon declined
from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s due to a number of pres-
sures including climatic changes in their North Atlantic feeding
grounds (Jonsson and Jonsson, 2004). This resulted in periods of
lowabundance in 1991e1992 and 1996e2003. Spring-running sub-
populations declined most markedly (Butler et al., 2008). Harbour
seal numbers also declined steeply over this period (Fig. 2).
There has been a long history of conflict between salmon fish-
eries and seals in Scotland. Seals prey on fish migrating into river
estuaries and around coastal netting stations, interfering with
fishing and reducing the numbers available for capture, resulting in
demands from fishery stakeholders for seal culling (Moore, 2003).
In the Moray Firth the economic impacts are small, but in 2005 the
majority of fishery stakeholders still believed that seal culling was
necessary (Butler et al., 2011). Fishermen and scientists' percep-
tions of the extent of seal predation on salmon are polarised (e.g.
Graesser, 1991; Scottish Salmon Strategy Task Force, 1997;
Middlemas et al., 2003, 2006).
Historically, under national legislation it has been legal for
fishery managers to shoot seals to protect fisheries. Outside closed
seasons covering pupping periods, when managers must apply to
the government for licenses to kill seals, shooting was unrestricted
and unreported. In the 1990s opposition to shooting from animal
welfare groups intensified (e.g. Advocates for Animals, 2002), and
the wildlife tourism industry was also promoting seal conservation
(Young, 1998). The decline in salmon abundance during the 1990s
prompted Moray Firth fisheries to intensify shooting, with up to
425 seals shot annually (Butler et al., 2008). Thompson et al. (2007)
concluded that this could have caused the decline in harbour seals
observed in 1992e2003 (Fig. 2).
2.2. The Moray Firth seal management plan
In 1992 the UK government adopted the European Union Hab-
itats Directive, which aims to secure the favourable conservation
status of listed species through the designation of Special Areas of
Conservation (SACs). Atlantic salmon, harbour and grey seals are
listed, and in 1999 salmon were included in SACs covering six
Moray Firth rivers. In 2000 harbour seals were included in the
Dornoch Firth SAC (Fig. 1). The designations presented an unprec-
edented challenge for seal and salmon management, because they
imposed new statutory responsibilities on the government and
DSFBs to ensure the favourable condition of the seal and salmon
SACs, yet the protection of one species potentially impinged upon
the status of the other. The situationwas exacerbated in 2002 when
an outbreak of Phocine Distemper Virus in Europe prompted the
Fig. 1. The Moray Firth, showing the locations of salmon rivers, the Dornoch Firth Special Area of Conservation (SAC) and salmon netting stations.
Fig. 2. Estimated numbers of wild adult salmon returning to Moray Firth rivers
(1980e2011), relative to harbour seals counted in the Dornoch Firth Special Area of
Conservation (SAC; 1992e2011) and the introduction of the MFSMP. Salmon abun-
dance is estimated from Marine Scotland catch statistics following Butler (2004). Seal
census data are from Duck et al. (2013).
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(‘Conservation Order’) for seal shooting. In the Moray Firth, no li-
cences were granted to DSFBs due to the government's concern
about declining harbour seal numbers in the Dornoch Firth SAC.
In response, a DSFB executive convened meetings between the
Moray Firth DSFBs and netsmen, who agreed to collectively nego-
tiate with the government to develop an alternative management
approach for seals and salmon. As a first step they provided his-
torical seal-shooting records to the government to enable an
assessment of shooting impacts on local seal populations. DSFBsalso engaged the wildlife tourism industry and other local stake-
holders through the Moray Firth Partnership, an integrated coastal
zone management group. National-level stakeholders were
engaged through the Seals Working Group, a consultative forum
established by the government in 2002.
Following three years of negotiation, the MFSMP was launched
in 2005 with five objectives:
1. Restore and maintain the favourable conservation status of
harbour seal and salmon SACs;
2. Reduce the impact of shooting on the harbour seal population;
3. Reduce the impact of seal predation on spring salmon, smolts
and salmon fisheries;
4. Monitor and research the status of seal and salmon populations,
and interactions between them;
5. Develop and implement non-lethal methods of managing seal
predation on salmon.
Key facets were as follows (see Butler et al. (2008) for details):
 A Moray Firth-specific Conservation Order was introduced in
2004, maintaining the annual close season. Moray Firth DSFBs
apply jointly for an annual licence to shoot a specified number of
seals;
 In consultation with its advisory agencies, the government ap-
plies the Potential Biological Removal (PBR) method (Wade,
1998) to estimate the number of seals that can be removed
without causing a population decline, based on annual censuses
of Moray Firth seal populations;
 Fishery and tourism stakeholders agreed that only ‘rogue’
seals which enter river mouths and harass netting stations
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covered these zones but excluded seal haul out sites. These
seals would be principally be targeted in JanuaryeJune to
protect spring-running adult salmon and emigrating juvenile
salmon smolts;
 Marksmen were nominated and trained in firearms safety,
public relations, seal identification and retrieval of shot car-
casses for research;
 A research program was funded by the government in
2005e2010, involving collaboration between government sci-
ence agencies, universities and fishery stakeholders. Research
investigated the efficacy of acoustic deterrent devices (ADDs) as
a non-lethal deterrent for rogue seals, and the impact of seal
predation on fisheries.
The MFSMP was set within a multi-level governance framework
(Fig. 3). The primary governance process is the DSFBs' annual
licence application, including records of seals shot. This is reviewed
by the government in consultation with its advisory agencies and
the Seals Working Group. At the local level, DSFBs delegate an ex-
ecutive to coordinate licence applications, collate shooting data and
liaise with the government.3. Methods
3.1. Characterising the evolution of ACM
Our first research goal was to understand the evolution of ACM
in the context of conservation conflict, and the factors that trig-
gered the process. To achieve this, we qualitatively analysed key
events in 2002e2005 relative to the three phases of ACM identified
by Olsson et al. (2004b): Phase 1 ‘preparing the system for change’,
Phase 2 ‘the window of opportunity’, and Phase 3 ‘building resil-
ience of the desired state’. This was undertaken through content
analysis of interview data published by Young (2010) from 20
stakeholders.Fig. 3. The MFSMP's governance framework and stakeholders' levels and linkages. Thick
Government; MSS Marine Scotland Science; SMRU Sea Mammal Research Unit; SNH Scottish3.2. Identifying factors associated with success
Our second research goal was to identify the factors associated
with the MFSMP's success.
3.2.1. Progress towards objectives
To most clearly identify parameters associated with effective
ACM, it is important to calibrate them against empirical evidence of
the attainment of an intervention's objectives (Plummer et al.,
2012). Hence, to assess the MFSMP's progress, in 2011 we
reviewed available condition reports for the SACs, results from the
research program, licence applications, shooting records, seal
census and salmon catch data.
3.2.2. Outcome parameters
To identify the parameters linked to the MFSMP's progress, we
applied Plummer and Armitage's (2007) outcome evaluation
framework. This proposes outcome parameters to be measured
within three components: ecosystem condition (incorporating
slow and fast variables that determine the state of the social-
ecological system), sustainable livelihoods (incorporating sus-
tainable resource use, institutions, power, vulnerability and
adaptive capacity), and process (incorporating pluralism and
linkages, communication and negotiation, trans-active decision-
making and learning). The components are combined to create 20
overlapping parameters across three scales (Table 1): first order
(tangible and intangible accruing from the intervention), second
order (accruing outside the intervention's problem domain) and
third order (latent outcomes manifesting after the intervention's
completion).
3.2.3. Trends in pre-conditions
To analyse the strength of pre-conditions necessary for the
maintenance of ACM, and to assess whether these had altered over
time, we applied Armitage et al.'s (2009) 10 parameters. To identify
how these pre-conditions had changed, we evaluated the param-
eters retrospectively for 2005 (when the MFSMP was launched),er lines represent the primary governance processes. Abbreviations are: SG Scottish
Natural Heritage; DSFB District Salmon Fishery Board; ADD acoustic deterrent device.
Table 1
Plummer and Armitage's (2007) ACM outcome parameters showing their groups and components (E ecosystem condition; L sustainable livelihoods; P process), and sum-
maries of interviewees' explanatory statements for their scores (see Fig. 5). Duplicated statements are listed only once.
Parameter Component Summaries of statements
First order, tangible
(from the initiative)
1. Resource management plans E, L Production of MFSMP; integration of MFSMP measures into DSFB management plans
2. Conflict resolution regarding
resource
P Fishery and conservation stakeholders have accepted compromise; shooting
transparency
3. Codified statement of action P Clear objectives for all parties; clear actions on numbers and locations for shooting
4. Agreed upon sanctions P Conservation Order provided the option for withdrawing licences as a sanction
5. New institutional
arrangements
P, L MFSMP a new arrangement; it precipitated the Marine (Scotland) Act and national
approach
First order, intangible
(from the initiative)
6. Legitimisation of policies
and actions
P Licensed shooting and marksmen legitimise MFSMP and government; respect for PBR
7. Greater adaptive capacity L DSFBs accept that seal-salmon interactions are more complex; PBR is an adaptive tool
8. Social and human capital L Greater collaboration and trust amongst fisheries and scientists; training of marksmen
9. Creative ideas for problem
solving
P Annual PBR and licences for DSFBs and nets; regional-scale coordination; ADDs
10. Questioning of routines,
values and
P Challenged fishery pre-conceptions of seal predation; forced stakeholders to see
others' governance perspectives
Second order
(outside the initiative)
1. New co-operation beyond
problem
P DSFB and government sawbill duck plan discussions; Moray Firth Sea Trout
Project 2008
2. Engagement and learning
across scales
P Scaling-out of MFSMP model through Marine (Scotland) Act; learning among
stakeholders
3. Changes in perceptions and
actions
P Fisheries see seal predation and conservation differently; MFSMP influenced
national policy
4. Efficiency responding to
other issues
P Stakeholders' ability to respond to distemper and sawbill duck issues enhanced
5. Addressing other issues
within the problem
P Marine (Scotland) Act implemented; brought salmon farming industry into
seal management
Third order
(evident subsequently)
1. Local learning to live with
uncertainty
L DSFBs more adaptive (catch and release, reviewing hatcheries, habitat improvement)
2. Local self-organization
matching scales
L DSFBs improving application of science and regional coordination
3. Empowerment of broader
community
L Fishery stakeholders engaged in seal monitoring and fisheries research; Moray Firth
Partnership and community not well engaged
4. Ongoing co-operative
approaches
P DSFB and government sawbill duck management; anglers involved in management
5. New institutions codified in
law
P, L Moray Firth Conservation Order and Marine (Scotland) Act
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Our third goal was to develop and test a participatory method to
operationalise Plummer and Armitage's (2007) and Armitage
et al.'s (2009) parameter frameworks. In SeptembereOctober
2011 the first and second authors carried out structured interviews
with seven stakeholders from government, government agencies,
salmon fisheries and wildlife tourism. These were selected because
they had been involved in the design and implementation of the
MFSMP since 2005, and therefore had the greatest longitudinal
knowledge of its evolution.
Interviews were carried out individually. To counter ‘memory
distortion’ (Wiek et al., 2014), the MFSMP's genesis and evolution
was reviewed at the interview's start. In each interview,
Plummer and Armitage's (2007) 20 parameters were posed
sequentially as propositions (Appendix 1), and the interviewee
was asked to respond on a 5-point Likert scale of ‘strongly agree’
(2), ‘agree’ (1), ‘maybe’ (0), ‘disagree’ (1), and ‘strongly disagree’
(2). For each score the interviewee was asked to provide an
explanatory statement for their score. Armitage et al.'s (2009) 10
pre-condition parameters were then also posed as propositions
(Appendix 1), and scored from ‘weak’ (1) to ‘very strong’ (5) for
2005 and then 2011. Explanatory statements were also requested
for each score.
Interviews took 1e2 h. Interviewee's scores and summaries of
their statements were typed directly into a pre-prepared spread-
sheet on a laptop. To mitigate ‘response style bias’, the seven Likert
scores given for each parameter were later averaged to standardiseresponses (van Vaerenbergh and Thomas, 2013). Also, for Plummer
and Armitage's (2007) first, second and third order outcome pa-
rameters, all scores in each group of parameters were averaged.
This provided a more robust composite measure of outcomes in
each parameter group (de Vaus, 2002).4. Results
4.1. Characterising the evolution of ACM
The evolution of ACM in 2002e2005 matched the three phases
identified by Olsson et al. (2004b):
 Phase 1 Preparing the system for change: triggered by a resource
crisis, or an exogenous shock, leadership emerges amongst local
resource stewards. These ‘policy entrepreneurs’ build ecological
knowledge of the problem, develop bridging social networks
between stakeholders from different levels, and provide a vision
and goal for an alternative pathway (Olsson et al., 2004b). In the
Moray Firth this phase was triggered by the designation of seal
and salmon SACs, which altered the statutory remits of gov-
ernment and DSFBs. Combined with a growing wildlife tourism
industry, opposition to seal shooting, the potential distemper
epidemic and declines in harbour seal and salmon abundance,
DSFBs were forced to collaborate and compromise with the
government, which maintained control by withholding licences
under the national Conservation Order. The role of policy
entrepreneur was taken by a DSFB executive, who brokered
collaboration among the fishery stakeholders, and engaged with
Fig. 4. The annual Potential Biological Removal (PBR), numbers licensed and recorded
shot for a) harbour seals and b) grey seals in the Moray Firth, 2005e2011. PBRs were
not calculated for grey seals in 2005e2010.
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Firth-specific Conservation Order and Management Areas. He
also established trust by negotiating the provision of seal
shooting records to the government. In turn, government offi-
cials were willing to experiment and champion the alternative
approach.
 Phase 2 The window of opportunity: in this phase policy en-
trepreneurs exploit policy windows at higher political levels to
enact the alternative management agreed in Phase 1 (Olsson
et al., 2004b). In the Moray Firth, the window was the expiry
of the national Conservation Order in 2004, and the opportunity
to introduce a Moray Firth-specific Order. The formation of the
Moray Firth Partnership and the Seals Working Group also
provided a forum for DSFBs to legitimise the seal-salmon fishery
conflict and broker support amongst regional and national
stakeholders.
 Phase 3 Building resilience of the desired state: following
Phases 1 and 2, a ‘policy community’ is formed. This consists of
social networks and alliances between stakeholders with
common interests that arise during the window of opportu-
nity, who act to re-build resilience of the social-ecological
system's desired state (Olsson et al., 2004b). The introduction
of the MFSMP represented the culmination of partnership and
trust-building between the DSFBs, netsmen and other local,
regional and national stakeholders. The initiation of the
research program also required scientists and fishery stake-
holders to co-design investigations into seal-salmon in-
teractions and ADDs.
The resulting governance framework (Fig. 3) also reflects attri-
butes of ACM. From the adaptive perspective it involves an annual
cycle of licence application and reporting by DSFBs, appropriate
assessment and licensing based on annual seal censuses and the
PBR method, augmented by the research program's results. Co-
management is evident in the negotiations between DSFBs and
the government over annual licences, the cross-level linkages and
networks between stakeholders, and the multi-stakeholder forum
provided by the Seals Working Group. Knowledge integration and
learning is evident in the training of marksmen and the research
program, which draw on science and fishery stakeholders'
knowledge.4.2. Identifying factors associated with success
4.2.1. Progress towards objectives
 Objective 1 Restore and maintain the favourable conservation
status of harbour seal and salmon SACs: in 2003e2004 the
government carried out condition assessments for the salmon
SACs, and all were classified as ‘unfavourable recovering’. In
2009 harbour seals in the Dornoch Firth SAC were assessed, and
also classified as ‘unfavourable recovering’. In 2011 all of these
sites were re-assessed, and all but one was judged to be
improving or recovered.
 Objective 2 Reduce the impact of shooting on the harbour seal
population: licences for harbour and grey seals varied according
to annual census data, and as a precautionary measure were set
below the PBR (Fig. 4). Numbers of seals shot never exceeded the
licences, and in 2005e2011 declined from 47 to 6 harbour seals,
and 46 to 16 grey seals.
 Objective 3 Reduce the impact of seal predation on spring
salmon, smolts and salmon fisheries: monthly details of seals
shot were only available for 2005, 2006 and 2011. Overall, 43% of
seals were shot during JanuaryeJune, but it was impossible toassess the benefits for spring salmon, smolts or fisheries due the
lack of appropriate information.
 Objective 4 Monitor and research the status of seal and salmon
populations, and interactions between them: harbour seal
numbers recovered in the Dornoch Firth SAC in 2006, but the
population has not subsequently returned to levels of the early
1990s. Annual salmon runs recovered in 2006e2011 to levels
similar to the mid-1990s (Fig. 2), reflecting a period of improved
marine survival (Marine Scotland, 2013). Monitoring of seal
abundance in rivers showed that the highest numbers occurred
during the winter and early spring (Graham et al., 2011a), con-
firming modelling that spring salmon are most likely to be
impacted by predation (Butler et al., 2006). Photo-identification
and telemetry demonstrated that some individual seals
specialize in using rivers (Graham et al., 2011a, b). Samples
collected from seals shot in rivers showed that these individuals
were more likely to consume salmonids than seals hauling out
at coastal sites (Graham et al., 2011b). Together the results
justified the targeting of rogue seals in Management Areas
(Graham and Harris, 2010).
 Objective 5 Develop and implement non-lethal methods of
managing seal predation on salmon: one ADD was trialled
successfully in a river mouth in 2007e2008, where it reduced
upstream seal movement by 50% (Graham et al., 2009). Another
was tested at a netting station in 2009e2010 with some success
Fig. 5. Average scores and ranges given by interviewees for Plummer and Armitage's (2007) ACM outcome parameters (n ¼ 7 scores for each parameter), and averages across the
groups of tangible first order, intangible first order, second and third order parameters (n ¼ 35 scores for each group). See Table 1 for summaries of interviewees' explanatory
statements.
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due to cost and operational difficulties.4.2.2. Outcome parameters
The average scores of all parameters were positive, indicating
that all ACM outcomes were evident (Fig. 5). As a group, the
tangible first order parameters scored highest, followed by intan-
gible first order parameters, indicating that the strongest outcomes
had accrued directly from the MFSMP. Averages for the second and
third order parameter groups were lower but similar, indicating
weaker outcomes outside and subsequent to the MFSMP's
introduction.
The highest scoring parameter was ‘resource management
plans’ (Fig. 5). Interviewees' explanations showed that this was
related to the production of the MFSMP, and also integration of its
measures into local DSFB fishery management plans (Table 1). The
second was ‘new institutional arrangements’, which related to the
MFSMP and the national scaling-out of the approach under the
Marine (Scotland) Act in 2011. Third was ‘conflict resolution
regarding the resource’, due to the transparency of shooting ar-
rangements and a compromise being reached by all stakeholders.Fourth was ‘new institutions codified in law’, which related to the
Moray Firth-specific Conservation Order and the Marine (Scotland)
Act. Fifth was ‘questioning routines, values and governance’, which
reflected the adjustment of fishery stakeholders' pre-conceptions
about the impact of seal predation and appreciation of each
others' perspectives. Four of these parameters were from the pro-
cess component of Plummer and Armitage's (2007) framework
(Table 1).
The lowest score was for ‘creative ideas for problem solving’,
with some interviewees disagreeing that this had occurred (Fig. 5).
Although the annual PBR, licensing and regional-scale coordination
was innovative, ADDs had been trialled but not widely adopted
(Table 1). Another weak outcome was ‘new cooperation among
stakeholders’ outside the seal-salmon conflict, despite some
collaboration between DSFBs and government in managing
another conservation conflict, predation of juvenile salmon by
protected sawbill ducks. ‘Engagement and learning across scales’
and ‘ongoing co-operative approaches’ were also weak.
4.2.3. Trends in pre-conditions
The first four pre-conditions suggested by Armitage et al. (2009)
are a well-defined natural resource system, small scale resource
J.R.A. Butler et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 160 (2015) 212e225 219use, an identifiable set of social entities with shared interests, and
clear property rights to the resources. Interviewees considered that
the resources were only moderately well-defined because although
harbour seals are largely resident in the Moray Firth, the ranges of
grey seals and salmon extend over the North Sea and North
Atlantic, respectively. Resource use, stakeholders and resource
property rights were clear. Interviewees considered that these
characteristics had not altered between 2005 and 2011.
Hence we only show the results for the remaining six parame-
ters (Fig. 6, Table 2). With the exception of ‘an adaptable portfolio of
management measures’, whose score had increased due to the
introduction of the variable annual licence, PBR and ADDs, all
others had declined. The highest scoring parameter, ‘leaders pre-
pared to champion the process’, had fallen from very strong to
medium because government leadership had diverted their
attention to scaling-out the model through the Marine (Scotland)
Act, and perceptions that the MFSMP had become successfully
established. One interviewee stated that the MFSMP had become
“part of the furniture now”. ‘Commitment to a long term
institution-building process’ and a ‘policy environment supportive
of collaborative management’ had also declined from strong posi-
tions for similar reasons. Government interviewees noted that in
2005 “there was a desire to try and be supportive and to collabo-
rate”, and the MFSMP “was quite risky and could have gone pear-
shaped”. Interviewees also mentioned that the Seals Working
Group had notmet since 2009, and theMoray Firth Partnershipwas
no longer engaged with the MFSMP.
‘Drawing on a plurality of knowledge’ had declined because of
declining interest amongst stakeholders and falling numbers of
stakeholders actively engaged in the process. One interviewee
remarked that in 2011 “it is mainly expert knowledge and there's
not a lot of openness”. Provision of training, capacity building and
resources had also declined slightly because since 2005 there had
been no further training of marksmen or other events, and the
research program had concluded in 2010 when funding ended.
5. Discussion
5.1. Characterising the evolution of ACM
Unlike ACM processes that have been intentionally engineeredFig. 6. Averages and ranges of interviewees' scores for Armitage et al.'s (2009) ACM pre-con
Table 2 for summaries of interviewees' explanatory statements.(e.g. Cundill and Fabricius, 2010; Smedstad and Gosnell, 2013), the
MFSMP evolved organically, as have governance transformations in
the Kristianstads wetlands (Olsson et al., 2004b) and the Great
Barrier Reef (Olsson et al., 2008). Olsson et al. (2004a, 2006) suggest
that the process is an emergent property within social-ecological
systems in response to shocks, or when slow variables approach
thresholds that can alter the system's state. Plummer (2009) pro-
poses a range of exogenous factors that may trigger ACM, including
resource crises, changing legal mandates, or alterations in the
socio-political context. In the Moray Firth, two exogenous shocks
were instrumental: the introduction of SACs, which altered stake-
holders' legal responsibilities, and the distemper outbreak that
precipitated the 2002 national Conservation Order. Trends in two
slow variables, the abundance of harbour seals and salmon, also
reached critically low levels in the late 1990s, constituting a
resource crisis. The growing public support for seal conservation
driven by wildlife tourism and the animal welfare lobby's opposi-
tion to seal shooting was another important slow variable.
The resulting development and implementation of the MFSMP
matched the three phases identified by Olsson et al. (2004b). Phase
1 was characterised by the leadership and vision provided by a
DSFB executive who brokered collaboration and trust amongst all
stakeholders, and developed an alternative pathway for managing
seal and salmon conflict. This was a compromise, allowing limited
seal shooting under mutually agreed conditions. In Phase 2 the
DSFB executive exploited the opportunity to establish a newMoray
Firth-specific Conservation Order, and engaged with the Moray
Firth Partnership and the Seals Working Group to legitimise the
proposal. In Phase 3 a policy community was formed and the
MFSMP was launched, including cross-level linkages between
multiple stakeholders that were reflected in the MFSMP's gover-
nance structure.
Plummer (2009) identified the attributes of individuals and
organisations and the properties of social networks as factors that
enable ACM. In the Moray Firth these were all evident. Leadership
amongst local resource managers (i.e. DSFBs) was critical, and
bridging networks created amongst other fishery stakeholders and
government were instrumental. The willingness of government
stakeholders to experiment with the suggested alternative
approach was equally important.
Hence the determinants of the MFSMP's evolution mirror thosedition parameters in 2005 and 2011 (n ¼ 7 scores for each parameter in each year). See
Table 2
Armitage et al.'s (2009) ACM pre-condition parameters, and summaries of interviewees' explanatory statements supporting their scores for each parameter for 2005 and 2011
(see Fig. 6). Duplicated statements are listed only once.
Indicator 2005 2011
1. Access to adaptable portfolio of management measures Conservation Order was the only tool;
shooting was the only option
Variable annual licence based on PBR;
ADDs tested but they were designed
for fish farms, not rivers; ADDs expensive,
and energy source is a problem
2. Commitment to support a long term institution-building
process
Key government players fully engaged
through Seals Working Group; crisis engaged
all stakeholders
Stakeholders less committed because MFSMP
has been achieved; Marine (Scotland) Act has
diverted attention to other areas; MFSMP is part
of the furniture now; now it's long term, people
are less committed; Seals Working Group
hasn't met since 2009
3. Provision of training, capacity building and resources for
local, regional, and national-level stakeholders
Training courses for marksmen; government
funding for research; DSFB funding for local
coordination
No training since 2005; government research
funding stopped in 2010; resources generally
more limited
4. Key leaders or individuals prepared to champion
the process
Leadership from government and DSFBs;
DSFBs convinced local fishery stakeholders
and moved things forward
Only the DSFB coordinator: government
less active; need to reengage with fisheries,
local stakeholders and government leadership;
because the MFSMP is succeeding there's less
need for a champion
5. Openness of participants to share and draw upon
a plurality of knowledge
Excellent example of fishermen, policy makers
and scientists coming together; fishery stakeholders
felt in control and everyone was working together
Less interest now because they know what
they're doing; regular meetings needed to
update all stakeholders on new developments;
it is mainly expert knowledge and there's not a
lot of openness
6. National and regional policy environment supportive
of collaborative management
There was a desire to be supportive and collaborate;
it was risky and could have gone pear-shaped;
national government support but they left
participants to get on with the MFSMP
It's now top-down; need to get together and
discuss progress; the new legislation is clearer;
processes are more transparent; decision-making
is better and fairer; the Moray Firth Partnership is
not engaged with the MFSMP as before
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first was the influence of changing legal mandates and structures.
The designation of SACs was a key trigger, and the expiry of the
national Conservation Order in 2004 provided an opportunity to
introduce a Moray Firth-specific Conservation Order, which formed
the legal framework and legitimacy for the alternative governance
model. The secondwas the role of government power. Although the
evolution of the MFSMP was initially bottom-up, fishery stake-
holders were forced to negotiate because the government had
effectively banned seal shooting in 2002. The third was a mutual
acceptance of compromise. Fishery stakeholders accepted that only
small numbers of rogue seals could be targeted, and conservation
interests agreed that some seal shooting was necessary to protect
fisheries. Hence in situations of entrenched conservation conflict
these may be important pre-requisites for the emergence of ACM.
5.2. Identifying factors associated with success
Having reached Phase 3, substantial progress has been made
towards three of the MFSMP's five objectives. Since 2005 the con-
servation status of all SACs has improved, and harbour seal shoot-
ing has been significantly reduced. Consistent monitoring of
harbour and grey seals has been established, providing current data
for the annual calculation of PBRs and licences, and allowing a
flexible response to fluctuations in seal numbers. The identification
of rogue seals was an important discovery, justifying the targeted
shooting of small numbers in Management Areas. Less progress
was made for two objectives. Seal shooting in Management Areas
during JanuaryeJune may have reduced predation on spring
salmon and smolts, but evaluating this was impossible due to the
lack of necessary information. Also, ADDs were successfully trialled
but their adoption has been limited.
Stakeholders' evaluations using Plummer and Armitage's (2007)
framework suggested that five parameters are primarily associated
with this success. Most important was the production of the
MFSMP itself. Following this were four process parameters: newinstitutional arrangements, conflict resolution, new institutions
codified in law, and the questioning of routines, values and gover-
nance. The latter underpinned conflict resolution, because fishery
stakeholders' had re-considered their pre-conceptions about the
extent of seal predation on salmon, and all stakeholders had
reached a compromise. Because only seven stakeholders were
interviewed, the average scoresmay not provide a robust indication
of differences between parameters. However, the group averages
provided a more reliable indication that the tangible first order
parameters were most closely associated with the MFSMP's suc-
cess, including all of those listed above with the exception of new
institutions codified in law.
Interviewees' scoring of Armitage et al.'s (2009) pre-condition
parameters also highlighted factors associated with success, but
with the same caveat regarding averages. Highly-scored parame-
ters at the MFSMP's introduction in 2005 were strong support from
government and DSFB leaders who championed the process, plus
the commitment of these stakeholders to long term institution
building, and a policy environment which was supportive of
collaborative management. The sharing of a plurality of knowledge
by stakeholders was also strong, plus the provision of training and
capacity building. However, by 2011 these pre-conditions had
declined in strength because the MFSMP had been successfully
established, and government stakeholders had diverted attention
to scaling-out the model through the Marine (Scotland) Act.
Sharing of knowledge had also declined and become focused on
expert opinion. The only pre-condition which had strengthened
was the portfolio of management measures.
These results provide interesting insights into how ACM can
evolve after its establishment. Many published analyses examine
the process up to Phase 3, referred to as ‘building the resilience of
the desired state’ by Olsson et al. (2004b). In this case wewere able
to track ACM's trajectory up to and beyond Phase 3, covering 10
years from 2002 to 2011. This can be visualised in terms of three
dimensions (Fig. 7): adaptive management, occurring along a
spectrum from rigid to reflexive learning; co-management,
Fig. 7. ACM's trajectory in the Moray Firth in 2002e2011 in terms of the dimensions of adaptive management, co-management types, and numbers of stakeholders engaged. Olsson
et al.'s (2004b) three phases are illustrated, plus the fourth phase of ‘stakeholder apathy’.
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‘instructive’) to community-led (bottom-up or ‘informative’;
Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006); and the number of stakeholders
actively engaged in the process. Phase 1 and Phase 2 occurred in
2002e2004, when the negotiation of the MFSMP shifted the tra-
jectory significantly from ‘instructive’ to ‘cooperative’ co-
management, and increased learning enhanced the reflexivity of
adaptive management. The numbers of stakeholders engaged also
peaked. Since the introduction of the MFSMP and Phase 3 in 2005,
learning has grown cumulatively, but declining government sup-
port, plus the lack of cross-level dialogue, knowledge exchange and
decision-making has allowed co-management to revert towards
the ‘instructive’ type. Simultaneously, the numbers of stakeholders
engaged has declined as interest has waned. Hence we suggest that
ACM has entered a fourth phase of ‘stakeholder apathy’, which
although still achievingmany of theMFSMP's objectives, may result
in the re-emergence of conflict and a loss of system resilience.
The interviews prompted some respondents to suggest remedial
actions. First, government leadership should reengage with local
fishery stakeholders to revive power-sharing and dialogue across
levels. In particular, the Seals Working Group should be re-
convened to maintain a national consultative forum for stake-
holders, and local MFSMP stakeholders should re-engage with the
Moray Firth Partnership. Second, there is a need to re-invest in
capacity building and learning, including research and monitoring.
Third, the sharing of information has contracted, and regular multi-
stakeholder meetings are necessary to encourage knowledge
exchange.5.3. Participatory evaluation method
If undertakenwith stakeholders evaluation can contribute to the
reflection and learning aspects of ACM, fuelling the process (Cundill
and Fabricius, 2009; Fabricius and Currie, 2015). However, in-
dicators and data collection methods must be developed which are
appropriate and understandable to all participants. Plummer andArmitage's (2007) framework has been criticised for not being
practicable (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009), and few studies have
attempted to adapt it for real-world assessments (Cundill and
Fabricius, 2010; Smedstad and Gosnell, 2013).
Our approach operationalised and integrated Plummer and
Armitage (2007) and Armitage et al.'s (2009) frameworks into a
simple, replicable method. Testing it highlighted three issues worth
future consideration. First, although the interviewees had long
been associated with the MFSMP, the professional roles of two had
changed, hindering their ability to answer some questions confi-
dently. This presents an obstacle to maintaining consistency in
longitudinal evaluation. Second, evaluation could be undertaken as
a group exercise to encourage social learning and reflection
amongst stakeholders, particularly those whose livelihoods are
most impacted by the conflict. Following Cundill and Fabricius
(2010), focus groups could be used to discuss and score parame-
ters, but in situations of acute conflict this may not be feasible.
Third, the costs of long term evaluation should not be under-
estimated (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009), and must be accounted for
in the funding of ACM processes.5.4. Indicator framework for conservation conflict resolution
Based on the outcome and pre-condition parameters associated
with the MFSMP's success, plus those factors which interviewees
suggested should be rectified, we suggest an indicator framework
for the ongoing evaluation of ACM applied to conservation conflict
(Table 3). These are augmented with indicators specific to conflict
resolution drawn from the literature. Indicators are intended to
overlap and provide triangulation, as recommended by de Vaus
(2002) and Plummer and Armitage (2007).
For outcomes we include the important process parameters
identified by interviewees: new institutional arrangements, new
institutions codified in law, and questioning routines, values and
governance. We refine the conflict resolution process parameter by
splitting it into two indicators: an outcome acceptable to all parties,
Table 3
An indicator framework for evaluating outcomes and pre-conditions for ACM addressing conservation conflict, and their related components from Plummer and Armitage
(2007) and Armitage et al. (2009). Additions from the conflict resolution literature are italicised.
Indicator Component Source
A. Outcomes
1. New institutional arrangements Process and livelihoods e institutions Plummer and Armitage, 2007
2. New institutions codified in law Process and livelihoods e institutions Plummer and Armitage, 2007
3. Questioning of routines, values and governance Process e learning, conflict resolution Plummer and Armitage, 2007
4. Legitimisation of policies and actions Process e decision-making Plummer and Armitage, 2007
5. Agreed upon sanctions Process e decision-making Plummer and Armitage, 2007
6. Outcome acceptable to all parties Process e conflict resolution Redpath et al., 2013
7. No party asserting its interests to the detriment of others Process e conflict resolution Redpath et al., 2013
8. Creative ideas for problem-solving Process e learning, conflict resolution Plummer and Armitage, 2007
9. Engagement and learning across scales Process e learning, pluralism and linkages Plummer and Armitage, 2007
10. Changes in perceptions and actions Process e learning Plummer and Armitage, 2007
11. Resource management plan Ecosystem condition and livelihoods Plummer and Armitage, 2007
12. Acceptable conservation status of all contested species Ecosystem condition Plummer and Armitage, 2007
B. Pre-conditions
1. Adaptable portfolio of management resources Learning through complexity Armitage et al., 2009
2. Commitment to long-term institution building Institutions, incentives and governance Armitage et al., 2009
3. Provision of training and capacity building Learning through complexity Armitage et al., 2009
4. Leaders prepared to champion the process Institutions, incentives and governance Armitage et al., 2009
5. Stakeholders drawing on and sharing diverse knowledge Learning through complexity Armitage et al., 2009
6. Supportive policy environment Linking to policy Armitage et al., 2009
7. Formal and regular evaluation of outcomes and conditions
as a stakeholder learning process
Assessment and monitoring Armitage et al., 2009; Cundill and Fabricius, 2009
8. Quality of information and resources Learning through complexity Emerson et al., 2009
9. Transparency of stakeholders' goals and values Power dynamics, conflict resolution Adams et al., 2003; Salafsky, 2011
10. Trust amongst stakeholders Power dynamics, conflict resolution Ansell and Gash, 2008; Redpath et al., 2013
11. Presence of a bridging organisation or individual Institutions, incentives and governance Folke et al., 2005; Walkerden, 2005; Berkes, 2009
12. Participation of all impacted stakeholders Power dynamics, conflict resolution Ansell and Gash, 2008; Treves et al., 2009
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reflect the need to identify whether a compromise has been
reached, and to consider power dynamics amongst stakeholders
(Redpath et al., 2013), which are often overlooked but influential in
ACM (Nadasdy, 2007). The existence of a management plan was
also highly important in the Moray Firth. Also under the ecosystem
condition component we add an assessment of the conservation
status of all contested species. In the Moray Firth, harbour seal and
salmon abundance were important slow variables, and their de-
clines were partly responsible for triggering ACM.
For pre-condition parameters, we include the six from Armitage
et al. (2009) that were evaluated. To emphasise conflict resolution
we add five additional indicators. Quality of information and re-
sources available to stakeholders are critical in assisting dialogue
and balanced decision-making (Emerson et al., 2009), and this was
evident in the Moray Firth. Transparency of stakeholders' goals and
values is a key element of power dynamics and should be made
explicit to foster collaboration (Adams et al., 2003; Salafsky, 2011).
Trust among stakeholders is fundamental (Ansell and Gash, 2008),
as was apparent in the Moray Firth. The presence of a bridging
organisation or individual has also been shown to assist in nego-
tiating compromises (Walkerden, 2005; Butler et al., 2013), and is a
recognised enabler of ACM (e.g. Folke et al., 2005; Berkes, 2009;
Butler et al., 2013). Finally, participation of all impacted stake-
holders is important to further tackle power asymmetries (Ansell
and Gash, 2008; Treves et al., 2009). To these we add formal and
regular evaluation as a multi-stakeholder learning process, recog-
nising its important function in ACM (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009).
In addition, we recommend that Armitage et al.'s (2009) first
four pre-condition parameters should not be ignored (i.e. a well-
defined resource system, small scale resource use, an identifi-
able set of social entities with shared interests, and clear property
rights to the resource). In the Moray Firth these conditions were
only moderately satisfied due to the extensive ranges of grey seals
and salmon, causing an imperfect match between the ecological
and governance scales. Young et al. (2013b) also identified thechallenges of implementing community-based management at
the ‘meso-scale’ due to the difficulty of maintaining networks and
information flows among the numerous and dispersed
stakeholders.6. Conclusions
The MFSMP provided an opportunity to evaluate ACM in the
novel context of conservation conflict resolution. Also, it was
possible to calibrate ACM parameters against the attainment of
objectives, which is necessary for effective evaluation (Plummer
et al., 2012). While it evolved organically, the MFSMP's triggers
and evolutionary phases corresponded with other published ex-
amples. However, distinctive factors were the importance of legal
mandates and structures, the legal power held by government, and
perhaps as a consequence, the willingness of all stakeholders to
reach a compromise and experiment with an alternative approach.
These lessons can inform the design of similar initiatives for
resolving seal-salmon conflict in comparable social-ecological
contexts, and also other conflict arenas such as wild carnivores
preying on livestock (Butler et al., 2014).
Our study has implications for ACM and conflict resolution
theory. Plummer (2009) identifies the need to understand which
process parameters can be traded-off without undermining ACM.
The results suggest that in situations of entrenched conservation
conflict, leadership, cross-level social networks and policy win-
dows remain key determinants which cannot be traded-off, but
instead must be reinforced by legal mechanisms. Hence a strong
and consistent government role is a necessity (Young et al., 2012),
and consequently ACM is unlikely to progress towards a process
driven entirely by local stakeholders. This raises an interesting
question about the extent of power-sharing that is required to
achieve conflict resolution. Also, as observed elsewhere (e.g.
Cundill and Fabricius, 2010), the study highlights the need for long
term government support. However, self-financing mechanisms
based on local private resource users (e.g. DSFBs, tourism
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a more consistent source of support.
Based on the ACM parameters and pre-conditions associated
with the MFSMP's success, and augmented by a greater focus on
conflict resolution, we have presented an indicator framework for
further testing. This should be implemented in the MFSMP using
our participatory evaluation approach to establish a long term
evaluation program, and also in similar schemes being introduced
in Scotland under the Marine (Scotland) Act. The framework is
equally applicable to the longitudinal evaluation of conflict reso-
lution initiatives more generally, which outwardly are not recog-
nised as ACM but may share many of the same characteristics.Parameters Propositio
A. Outcomes
First order, tangible (from the initiative)
1. Resource management plans Resource m
conflict be
2. Conflict resolution regarding the resource Conflict be
3. Codified statements of action Specific ac
between [
4. Agreed upon sanctions Agreed sa
5. New institutional arrangements Changes h
[seal and s
First order, intangible (from the initiative)
6. Legitimisation of policies and actions Governme
are regard
7. Greater adaptive capacity Stakehold
to change
8. Social and human capital Stakehold
cooperatio
9. Creative ideas for problem solving Creative a
10. Questioning of routines, values, and
governance underlying the problem
Stakehold
its comple
Second order (outside the initiative)
1. New co-operation beyond the problem New partn
the stakeh
2. Engagement and learning across scales Stakehold
and local
become m
3. Changes in perceptions and actions Stakehold
of the pro
4. Efficiency responding to other issues Stakehold
efficiently
5. Addressing other issues within the problem domain Stakehold
relating to
Third order (evident subsequently)
1. Local learning to live with uncertainty Local stak
2. Local self-organisation matching scales Local stak
and match
3. Empowerment of the broader community Local com
have beco
4. Ongoing co-operative approaches Stakehold
other loca
5. New institutions codified in law New instit
Parameter Propositio
B. Pre-conditionsb
1. Access to adaptable portfolio of management measures Stakehold
of manage
2. Commitment to support a long term institution-building process Stakehold
establishin
3. Provision of training, capacity-building and resources for
local-, regional- and national-level stakeholders
Stakehold
for trainin
4. Key leaders or individuals prepared to champion the process Leaders ha
and are pr
5. Openness of participants to share and draw upon a plurality
of knowledge
Stakehold
accept the
6. National and regional policy environment supportive of
collaborative management
Governme
managem
a Each proposition was posed and a score recorded first for 2005, and then repeated f
b Armitage et al. (2009) also list four other pre-conditions: a well-defined natural resou
interests, and clear property rights to the resources. Their utility for longitudinal evaluaAcknowledgements
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Propositions posed to interviewees to elicit Likert scores andn
anagement plans or agreements have been produced to address the
tween [seal and salmon] stakeholders
tween [seal and salmon] stakeholders has been resolved
tions and objectives have been documented to address the conflict
seal and salmon] stakeholders
nctions have been established to address infringements of rules by stakeholders
ave been made to organisations, rules or usual practices regarding
almon] management
nt and other policies and actions relating to the [seal and salmon] conflict
ed as more legitimate by stakeholders
ers in the [salmon and seal] conflict have greater capacity to adapt
and uncertainty
ers in the [salmon and seal] conflict have developed leadership, trust,
n and social networks, plus new knowledge and skills
nd innovative ideas have been developed to solve the [seal and salmon] conflict
ers have reconsidered the underlying causes of the [seal and salmon] conflict,
xity, and the way it is currently being thought about and managed
erships or projects have been designed or implemented by
olders to deal with other issues beyond the [seal and salmon] conflict
ers from different scales and levels (e.g. national government
communities) involved in the [seal and salmon] conflict have
ore engaged, and are exchanging information and learning from one another
ers in the [seal and salmon] conflict have changed their perceptions
blem, and these are reflected in changes in their actions
ers in the [seal and salmon] conflict have gained greater ability to deal
with other problems
ers in the [seal and salmon] conflict have co-operatively tackled other issues
[seal and salmon] management
eholders in the [seal and salmon] conflict are more able to cope with uncertainty
eholders in the [seal and salmon] conflict are more capable of self-organisation
ing their management to the ecological scale concerned
munity members who are directly affected by the [seal and salmon] conflict
me more empowered by the process
ers in the [seal and salmon] conflict have continued to collaborate to address
l issues
utions triggered by [seal and salmon] stakeholders have been established in law
n a
ers in the [seal and salmon] conflict have access to an adaptable portfolio
ment measures to address the conflict
ers in the [seal and salmon] conflict are committed to the process of
g new management structures, rules and approaches to resolve the conflict
ers in the [seal and salmon] conflict from all levels have opportunities
g, learning and skills-building
ve emerged amongst the stakeholders in the [seal and salmon] conflict,
epared to champion the process
ers in the [seal and salmon] conflict are willing to exchange information and
ir different kinds of knowledge
nt policies at the national and regional level are enabling collaborative
ent amongst the stakeholders in the [seal and salmon] conflict
or 2011.
rce system, small scale resource use, an identifiable set of social entities with shared
tion is discussed in the paper.
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Plummer and Armitage, 2007; see Table 1) and pre-condition pa-
rameters (from Armitage et al., 2009; see Table 2). For the outcome
parameters, the 5-point Likert scale ranged from ‘strongly agree’ (2)
to ‘strongly disagree’ (2). For the pre-condition parameters, the
scale ranged from ‘weak’ (1) to ‘very strong’ (5). Propositions are
presented to assess conservation conflict between seal and salmon
stakeholders, but these can be substituted with the species and
stakeholders for the context concerned.References
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